David Davidian joined AUA in 2015. He received a BS degree in Nuclear Engineering from the University of Massachusetts and worked at the Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Plant as a Reactor Engineer. He went on to graduate studies at the University of Massachusetts for Systems Engineering and Control Systems. David Davidian subsequently worked for the Armenian Minister of Communications in 1992 and proposed an information infrastructure program for Armenia. Two years later, he introduced the same for Artsakh. He spent eleven years at Sun Microsystems as a Field Applications Engineer, then as a Principle Engineer in Technical Intelligence Analysis. From 2006 to 2011, he worked at IBM Federal as a Technical Intelligence Analyst and as IBM Federal’s Systems Architect for the US Air Force. Mr. Davidian and his family moved to Armenia in 2014.
AVA Diplomatic’s Exclusive Interview with Mr. David Davidian,
Lecturer at the American University of Armenia
What historical factors have contributed to the formation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?
The development of the Nagorno-Karabakh region, as a conflict zone, can be traced back to the Treaty of Gulistan in 1813, which marked the end of the first Russo-Persian War. As a result of this treaty, Persia (now Iran) ceded territories to Russia that are now part of [today’s] Russian Daghestan, eastern Georgia, much of Azerbaijan, and northern Armenia. The second Russo-Persian War culminated in the Treaty of Turkmenchay in 1828, leading to Russian dominance over the Caucasus. This treaty resulted in Russia gaining control over the Yerevan, Nakhichevan, and Talish Khanates, including Nagorno-Karabakh.
This Iranian loss was significant because, by the late 19th and early 20th centuries, pan-nationalist movements such as pan-Germanic, pan-Slavic, and pan-Turkic had gained considerable influence. Azerbaijani writers, including Ali Huseynzade, returned to Baku after working with Ziya Gökalp, the founder of Turanism, who promoted the idea of a pan-Turkic state long before the Young Turk Revolution in Constantinople. During the early 20th century, Azerbaijani leaders in the Caucasus championed Turkic cultural and political aspirations at the expense of Iranian influences.
Towards the end of World War I, the Ottoman Caucasian Islamic Army, led by Nuri Pasha, Enver Pasha’s younger brother, played a crucial role in shaping the region’s political landscape. The army’s actions led to the establishment of Azerbaijan as it exists today, by altering the demographic and political boundaries, particularly in areas east of Armenia by eliminating non-Muslim and non-Azerbaijani speaking ethnicities, resulting in the creation of large contiguous regions of Azerbaijani settlements as Nuri Pasha advanced toward Baku.
The Nagorno-Karabakh region, with over a ninety percent Armenian demographic, became a point of contention when Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia declared independence in late May 1918. Nagorno-Karabakh, with a significant Armenian majority, was effectively part of the newly proclaimed Armenian Republic, as was Nakhichevan, which had nearly a fifty percent Armenian population and faced intense pressure from Turkish influence.
After the Red Army’s intervention at the end of 1920, all three Caucasian republics were annexed by the Soviet Union. In 1923, Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhichevan were placed under Soviet Azerbaijani jurisdiction. Earlier, the British, in a quid pro quo, supported Azerbaijani control over Nagorno-Karabakh with their troops remaining in Azerbaijan to influence control of Caspian oil. Atatürk, seeking to consolidate Turkish influence, welcomed Azerbaijani control over Armenian-inhabited areas. The Soviets, in need of legitimacy, accommodated Atatürk’s demands despite the violent suppression of Armenians, including the massacre of half the Armenian population of Shushi in March 1920.
Throughout the Soviet era, Armenians frequently requested that Nagorno-Karabakh be transferred to Soviet Armenia, but these requests were unsuccessful. Nakhichevan’s Armenian population dwindled to only five percent by 1991.
As the Soviet Union disintegrated, Armenians faced pogroms and forced depopulation throughout Azerbaijan, particularly in and around Nagorno-Karabakh. In Baku alone, nearly a quarter of a million Armenians were violently expelled. Azerbaijan lost control over Nagorno-Karabakh and several surrounding areas during the First Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988-1994). This status quo persisted until September 2020, when Azerbaijan began a final offensive to reclaim Nagorno-Karabakh.
In 1994, Armenia should have signed a peace treaty with Azerbaijan. Unfortunately, its diplomacy was in its infancy and was unable to address Russian pressure to keep the conflict frozen and Turkish threats against Armenia.
How do you evaluate the role of international actors, particularly Russia and Türkiye, in this conflict?
There are multiple international interests at play in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. The policies of Russia shifted after Nikol Pashinyan was elected in 2018. This may not be surprising since there is evidence that Pashinyan’s election may have been a mild color revolution. A color revolution implies covert Western influence. Pashinyan’s rhetoric had anti-Russian overtones, at least in contrast with Armenian’s previous two leaders, Kocharyan and Sargsyan. This anti-Russia sentiment could only initially be on the surface, considering that critical elements of Armenia’s infrastructure were sold off and run by Russia over the previous two decades. As the 2020 Karabakh War demonstrated, Russia’s interest shifted towards Azerbaijan, with Russia providing little to no support for its CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) partner, claiming the war was on Azerbaijani territory. While technically accurate, in the post-war era, Azerbaijan occupied over two hundred square km of internationally recognized Armenian territory. The CSTO provided no remedy for this occupation. Russian peacekeepers who were supposed to protect the disarmed Armenians remaining in Nagorno-Karabakh after the war were equally ineffective, and as a result, 120,000 Armenians were forced to flee Nagorno-Karabakh with these ‘peacekeepers’ as bystanders. At this point, Russia could be blamed by Armenian authorities for the loss of several thousand Armenian soldiers and the complete loss of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan. Days before Russia entered Ukraine, Azerbaijan signed strategic agreements with Russia. Relative to Azerbaijan, Armenia became a liability for Russia.
Turkish anti-Armenian sentiment stems from the aftermath of their genocide of at least 1.5 million Armenians during WWI, ending Armenian civilization in Eastern Anatolia. Not only has the Turkish Republic existentially threatened Armenia, but it was the critical factor in Azerbaijan’s 2020 victory in their conquest of Nagorno-Karabakh in the 2020 war.
Given rapidly improved relations between Ankara and Moscow, the confluence of interests had its nexus with Azerbaijan at the expense of Armenia. For at least the previous decade, Armenia appeared to assume a frozen international dynamic, considering Russian soldiers guarded Armenia’s western and southern borders, an airfield in Yerevan, and a sizable Russian base in Armenia’s second city, Gyumri.
Israel has provided Azerbaijan with billions of dollars of high-tech military equipment for well over a decade and, in return, provides Israel with over forty percent of its crude oil sent over the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. Israeli-based journalists, as well as Israeli Parliament members, provided pro-Azerbaijani/anti-Armenian public relations. Israeli arms were used in concert with advanced Turkish weaponry to defeat the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Georgia lacks sufficient political power to exercise a fully independent foreign policy. Baku and Ankara heavily influence its foreign policy. Israeli and Turkish military transports used Georgian airspace to supply Azerbaijan in the 2020 War.
Iran was the only neighboring state that declared the 2020 Karabakh War must end without taking sides and assuring non-intervention by separatist Azerbaijani-speaking Iranians across Iran’s northwest border. There were claims made that arms entered Armenia through Iran, but these appear unsubstantiated.
How has Iran’s policy towards the Nagorno-Karabakh issue affected its relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan?
Given that the region of Nagorno-Karabakh is within accepted internationally recognized boundaries of Azerbaijan, Tehran congratulated Baku on their conquest. Yet, since the 1990s, Iran has urged the sides to reach a peaceful settlement. However, as part of the ceasefire agreement, it was agreed that transport mechanisms would be established in the greater region, specifically between Nakhichevan and mainland Azerbaijan. Russian border guards would man such a transport corridor. Azerbaijan interpreted this corridor as one that is outside of Armenian sovereignty, effectively subjecting Iran’s border with Armenia to be guarded by Azerbaijani or, at best, Russian proxies. Armenia is willing to provide routes between mainland Azerbaijan and its exclave, Nakhichevan, but such routes will remain part of sovereign Armenia. Just as Iran upheld the recognized borders of Azerbaijan, it supports the sovereignty of Armenia’s borders. Iran has made it very clear it will be unacceptable to Iran for any change in its border status. Yet Baku has repeatedly claimed southern Armenia as part of greater Azerbaijan up to and including Armenia’s capital, Yerevan. Periodically, there have been calls for the unification of the Republic of Azerbaijan with both East and West Azerbaijan provinces of Iran. Such political movements have been encouraged by powers interested in the disintegration of Iran. As a result, on several occasions, extensive military exercises and buildups have taken place on Iran’s border with Azerbaijan, especially since the 2020 Karabakh War.
Armenia’s good relationship with Iran is vital for its security, so much so that when US diplomacy urged Armenia to downgrade its ties with Iran, Armenia firmly refused. Anti-Armenian media constantly portrays relations between Armenia and Iran as potentially disruptive and supportive of Iranian foreign policy while ignoring, at least overtly, equally good relations Iran has with Azerbaijan. Covertly, it appears that Israel has bases that spy on Iran and could be used for activity against Iran. The existence of such bases has been noted as far back as 2012, when US diplomats and military intelligence officials claimed that Azerbaijan had granted Israel access to its air bases, particularly noting the ex-Soviet Sitalchay Military Airbase, just north of Baku. Indications exist that Israeli monitoring stations have been constructed in the areas formally under Armenian control before the 2020 Karabakh War. Iran is aware of such installations, which would negatively affect Iranian-Azerbaijani relations even though they are publicly characterized as brotherly.
Azerbaijan’s bid to join BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), with a north-south corridor created through Iran into Russia, Iranian-Azerbaijani relations might stabilize.
To what extent does Türkiye continue to provide military support to Azerbaijan as in previous years? What perspective do you envision for military cooperation between the two countries?
In 2010, Azerbaijan and Türkiye signed a strategic agreement where each would support the other in the case of a military attack or aggression against either of the countries. This agreement was taken to the extreme at the outbreak of the 2020 Karabakh war. The Azerbaijani General Staff was purged of personnel with Soviet leanings and replaced with Turkish ‘advisors.’ The First Deputy Minister of Defense of Azerbaijan and Chief of General Staff, Colonel General Najmeddin Sadigov, was charged with treason and cooperation with the Russian military intelligence service. Sadigov opposed Turkish dominance in the leadership of the Azerbaijani armed forces. During mid-2021, in Shusha [now Azerbaijan], Turkish, and Azerbaijani presidents Erdoğan and Aliyev signed the Shusha Declaration to increase their military cooperation, including building factories to manufacture Turkish military drones in Azerbaijan. The ‘two states, one nation’ have almost become ‘two states, one military.’ The agreement included political, economic, trade, culture, education, sport, and energy security sectors. Erdoğan dropped a hint of opening a military base in Azerbaijan.
In March of this year, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg noted Azerbaijan’s close military ties with NATO member Türkiye helped it to win the 2020 war in Nagorno-Karabakh.
What factors do you consider to have contributed to Azerbaijan’s recent military triumphs?
There is a confluence of complex factors that contributed to the success of the Azerbaijani military in capturing Nagorno-Karabakh. In the 1990s, when Armenians had a firm grip on Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding regions, the failure to secure a peace settlement, for many secondary reasons, including the strategic culture of Armenians, resulted in two things. First, a feeling of complacency in having militarily secured Nagorno-Karabakh deterring attempts to diplomatically secure this region, regardless of Russian pressure to keep it a frozen conflict. Second, decades of delay allowed Azerbaijan to use its oil revenue to purchase high-technology weaponry from Israel and Türkiye. The latter proved decisive in state-of-the-art situational awareness. Even though both sides in this war lost approximately five thousand soldiers, Azerbaijan emerged as the winner. It is important to note that neither side seriously attempted to attack the other’s infrastructure. This is noteworthy because it centralized the battle in the Nagorno-Karabakh area and surrounding regions.
The most crucial factor was the election of Nikol Pashinyan. As alluded to earlier, Pashinyan’s ascension and subsequent actions have characteristics of a light-color revolution and/or blatant incompetence. These hypotheses are based on a series of subsequent actions that were anti-Russian, especially Armenia’s eventual non-participation in the Kremlin-led CSTO. Pashinyan’s political outlook is similar to that of Armenia’s first president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, who generally viewed having secured Nagorno-Karabakh militarily (versus diplomatically) as a burden. Ter-Petrosyan also believed and openly expressed that if a state appears non-militaristic and suppresses any semblance of strong national goals, it would not be considered a threat. Neither Ter-Petrosyan nor Pashinyan understood schoolyard dynamics nor the anarchic realities of international relations. In Pashinyan’s case, his constant episodes of public panic throughout the fall of 2020 demonstrated this. Hypotheses exist and state that the Second Karabakh War was designed to be an engineered defeat by Armenia. There is no possibility of any Armenian government surviving if Nagorno-Karabakh was unilaterally released to Azerbaijani rule. However, suppose the appearance is given that it was fought over and lost. In that case, every excuse can be used, especially since it was ‘Russia’s fault’ for green-lighting the attack and not providing military or at least diplomatic assistance. Again, this is a hypothesis. However, one must consider and put into perspective the following: since assuming power in 2018, Pashinyan has had five Directors of the National Security Service, and six state officials died under circumstances deemed suspicious.
Additionally, four different Ministers of Defense have served under Pashinyan since 2018. Such frequent changes in critical ministries hinder coherent policy implementation. Many civilian Armenians volunteered to fight as soldiers in the 2020 Karabakh War, with many being informed that their assistance was not required.
In early 2021, Armenia’s general staff demanded Pashinyan’s resignation, citing indecisiveness during and after the 2020 Karabakh War. In retaliation, Pashinyan dismissed the Chief of the General Staff and his first deputy. Additionally, he has dismissed or arrested several combat generals from both Armenia and Karabakh. There has been no public accounting for the military or diplomatic reasons why Nagorno-Karabakh was lost and its population dispersed across Armenia and the larger region. Blaming ‘traitors’ or Russia might appease some in Armenia; however, such excuses are simple-minded.
Can the expansion of military and security cooperation between Türkiye and Azerbaijan have an impact on Iran’s political and military position in the region?
Securing an east-west (west as in NATO Türkiye, and east as in influence in Central Asia, through Azerbaijan) route, based on an opportunistic Turkic affinity, can result in the isolation or, at a minimum, create friction between east-west and north-south economic transportation routes, even with BRICS association between Azerbaijan and Iran. An expanded relationship between Türkiye and Azerbaijan can be a front against Russian interests in Turkic Central Asia and Iranian access north. Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and currently, Russia support Azerbaijani sovereignty over a corridor across southern Armenia. The most blatant violation of international law would be the forced annexation of southern Armenia by Azerbaijan. The US does not want Russia to control such a corridor.
Ultimately, one would suspect the east-west energy transport cash cow would trump a north-south economic road from Iran, Azerbaijan into Russia, or Georgia to Black Sea ports. China has invested heavily in and nearly completed a massive modern road system from Tbilisi to the Black Sea. Roads exist between Azerbaijan and Russia to the east of Tibilsi. It needs to be made clear how much of the BRICS opportunity will be adopted by the EU, especially after the war in Ukraine ends.
How do you see Israel’s efforts to reduce Iran’s influence in the Caucasus?
In a US diplomatic document from Wikileaks, Azerbaijani President Aliyev stated that the relationship between Azerbaijan and Israel is like an iceberg, with “nine-tenths of it below the surface.” What is significant beyond the one-tenth that is public, including Israel’s sale of billions of dollars in high-tech weaponry to Azerbaijan and Israel’s receipt of about forty percent of its crude oil from Azerbaijan? Israel seeks to extract as much benefit as possible from its relationship with Azerbaijan, even if it comes at Azerbaijan’s eventual expense. Israel’s support for Azerbaijan’s actions in Nagorno-Karabakh is intended to influence the population in Iran’s East and West Azerbaijan provinces to adopt a more Baku-centric Azerbaijani identity, foster separatism, and complicate Iran’s role as a mediator in the Caucasus. Iran’s interest would naturally align with supporting Armenian sovereignty over its internationally recognized borders, which can give the impression that Iran favors Armenia over Azerbaijan.
What factors have brought Azerbaijan closer to Israel?
David Ben-Gurion established a strategy known as the Periphery Doctrine, aimed at forming strategic alliances with countries on the periphery of the Arab states – countries that were not directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict but were significant allies who could provide diplomatic support and economic opportunities. Classic examples of this doctrine include Türkiye, and Iran when ruled by Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. While Azerbaijan is an oligarchic dictatorship, it does have valuable hydrocarbons and a need for state-of-the-art arms. Azerbaijan has imported billions of dollars worth of Israeli weaponry and provides approximately forty percent of Israel’s crude oil supply. This supply has continued even as Israel continues devastating Gaza. The oil flows through Türkiye, which has also not halted crude oil exports to Israel, despite President Erdoğan’s harsh criticism of Netanyahu. Azerbaijan has not recognized Palestine as a state, but Armenia has.
Israel can undoubtedly purchase crude oil from many parts of the world; however, Azerbaijan provides access to Israel in a much more stable environment than Iraqi Kurdistan. Moreover, articles written in Israel often praise Azerbaijan for being a tolerant state (neglecting the ethnic cleansing of Armenians) and a historic haven for Jews, historically referred to as Mountain Jews. Besides the fact that such articles are mainly written to appease Israelis who may be wary of receiving a significant portion of their crude oil from a Muslim-majority state, the vast majority of Jews who lived in Azerbaijan have left. There are likely more Jews in Iran than in Azerbaijan. As part of the pro-Azerbaijani PR campaign from Israel, there have been calls for the union of the Republic of Azerbaijan with the East and West Azerbaijan provinces. This reminds one of the post-WWII Soviet Azerbaijan People’s Government and the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad on occupied Iranian land.
Providing Azerbaijan with high-tech weaponry and publishing nationalistic PR while simultaneously portraying Armenia negatively for having any relations with Iran (even though Azerbaijan has nearly equal per capita trade revenue with Iran) contributes to the emerging Azerbaijani ethos that it is a powerful state capable of defeating Armenians. The hope is that this revanchism would spill over into northwest Iran. It’s not that Israel dislikes Armenia; instead, it has interests where Armenia may be a peripheral casualty.
This is not the first time similar actions have resulted in such victimhood. Zionists, in various forms, helped facilitate the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire by promoting Turkish nationalism and distancing Turks from the center of the Islamic Caliphate. T.E. Lawrence did something similar with the Arabs. The secondary result of this was the Turkish genocide of the Armenians and the rise of virulent pan-Turkism. The remnants of this effort were evident in Shusha in 2021 and again in July of this year at the Summit of the Heads of State of the Organization of Turkic States in Shusha.
Has the Republic of Azerbaijan managed to create a logical balance in its relations with Iran and with Israel?
This is a difficult question to answer because Azerbaijan’s relations with Iran are likely to be contentious, while its relationship with Israel might appear opportunistic. How often must Iran gather troops and arms on the Azerbaijani border before relations are indeed strained? Considering possible military scenarios between Iran and Israel, both Türkiye and Azerbaijan might attempt to annex Iran’s East and West Azerbaijan provinces and all of southern Armenia. Furthermore, only last year did Azerbaijan feel compelled to send its first ambassador to Israel. This does not indicate a particularly open or balanced public relationship.
How can Iran play a role as an effective actor in resolving Armenia’s internal crises?
Iranians and Armenians have been around for a long time. The last time they were at war was over fifteen hundred years ago. Unfortunately, Armenia has a limited history of institutional diplomacy, losing its independence over seven hundred years ago. This is not the case with Iran. Instead of only making public statements about items of mutual interest, even those on the periphery of Iranian interest, closer consultation at the diplomatic level might help Armenia make more informed decisions based on expert diplomacy and military affairs. This doesn’t have to be made public; Azerbaijan does this daily with Turkish experts.
How can Iran contribute to enhancing security and stability in the Caucasus?
Iran needs to remain an honest broker.
In an article, you mentioned that the former Azerbaijani Jews who immigrated to Israel several decades ago tried to participate in the construction of the corridor connecting Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan. Do you have any more detailed information on this?
Upon examining those articles, what might appear to be Azerbaijani Jews were Israelis. In the English-language Israeli media, there are a handful of writers who support an expansionist Azerbaijan, including proposals that are not in the interests of either Armenia or Iran, such as an extraterritorial corridor across southern Armenia. Such a corridor would quickly atrophy to its south, even if implemented just north of the Armenia-Iran border, would effectively sever Iran from Armenia.
Recently, the Russian peacekeeping forces left Zvartnots Airport in Yerevan after 32 years, and the inspection and protection of the air border was handed over to the Armenian side. Will the continuation of this trend lead to a decrease in Russia’s influence in Armenia?
Replacing Russian guards at Zvartnots Airport in Yerevan is a symbolic move. Many of these guards have been in Armenia for many years with their families, and it has been reported that some will take up guard duty at the Turkish-Armenian border. There may be additional actions to reduce Russian influence in Armenia. One example is replacing Russian gas with that from Iran.
To what extent has Russia’s focus on the war with Ukraine in Eastern Europe led to a more heightened presence of NATO in the Republic of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia (South Caucasus)?
The assumption here is that Russia was distracted by events in Ukraine, allowing more NATO inroads into the Southern Caucasus. However, I do not believe the war in Ukraine overstretched Russia enough that it had little bandwidth for events in the Southern Caucasus. Taking Georgia as an example, the massive influx of Chinese investment has shifted Georgia’s focus away from its previous mantra of pursuing NATO and EU membership at all costs. Diplomats noted this as a tilt away from the West, giving it a pro-Russian flavor. The West appeared too late to counter this Georgian-Chinese initiative. The passage of the Georgian foreign agent legislation is indicative of this shift. As noted earlier, both Ankara and Baku heavily influence Georgian foreign policy. With Georgian parliamentary elections scheduled for this October and considering the propensity for color revolutions this year, it would not be surprising to see a second revolution in Georgia.
The existence of Turkish troops and advisors in Azerbaijan is well known. Still, Azerbaijan has also applied for BRICS membership and signed a strategic agreement with Russia, which would likely limit anything more than a nominal Turkish presence in Azerbaijan. It is interesting to note that earlier in August, Israel ordered all off-duty soldiers currently in Azerbaijan and Georgia to return to Israel immediately, citing security concerns.
Armenia, unlike Georgia, has no NATO connections. Over the past year, there have been small groups of US soldiers in Armenia for limited training with Armenian peacekeeping forces. In mid-July, the United States and Armenia conducted joint military exercises, known as Eagle Partner 2024, from July 15 to 24. There is no indication of a permanent US military presence in Armenia beyond this specific exercise. However, the US will have a military representative serving as an advisor in Armenia’s Ministry of Defense and will guide defense reforms and cooperation.
Any NATO presence in Georgia will be under pressure to minimize its activities, and any NATO presence in Azerbaijan would be Turkish. All of this is observed closely by Russia.
To what extent has France become a key defense partner for Armenia?
It has been speculated that after the French were asked to leave many of their African colonies, they sought new areas of influence, such as Armenia. French President Macron is an anti-Russian globalist and sensed anti-Russian sentiment in Armenia and capitalized on it. Azerbaijan reacted strongly to this French arms overture and their assignment of a military attaché to their embassy in Armenia. France accused Azerbaijan of meddling in the political affairs of New Caledonia, a French overseas territory in the Pacific.
A military cannot simply add arms from different manufacturers and expect them to work in an integrated manner. Armenia has also purchased Indian weapons and still has a supply of Russian weaponry.
Because the policies of the Armenian military are not public, one might conclude that Armenia wishes to diversify away from traditional Russian-Soviet weaponry. It is unclear if France will be a long-term defense partner or if the relationship will last until Macron is replaced. Macron is under pressure from conservative elements in the newly elected government.
Türkiye and Armenia began negotiations to normalize their relations in January 2022, with the first round mediated by Russia in Moscow. Will we witness the normalization of relations between the two countries and the reopening of the borders of the two countries during the terms of President Erdoğan and Prime Minister Pashinyan?
Türkiye could have opened the border with Armenia at any time. However, Türkiye is delaying the opening, hoping to pressure Armenia to make more concessions in the peace process with Azerbaijan. It appears that both Erdoğan and Aliyev are involved in delaying any deal with Armenia until after the US presidential election and, to a lesser extent, until the outcome of the Ukrainian war is evident. More importantly, developments between Iran and Israel could radically change the entire region before the US election in November.
Will Nikol Pashinyan be able to reach peace with Azerbaijan and stabilize his political position before the 2026 elections?
This question continues from the previous one. Pashinyan is not very popular. Unfortunately for Armenia, the best and brightest have been marginalized from leadership positions over the past three decades. Most countries, even dictatorships, have a leadership class. Such a class struggles to exist in Armenia, as each set of previous and current leaders—Ter-Petrosyan, Kocharyan, Sargsyan, and Pashinyan—has isolated and demonized potential rivals. This is a strategic mistake, but one that can be remedied. Like many small countries, Armenia lacks a grand strategy. It’s not that the Pashinyan government doesn’t know what it’s doing; it is simply engaging in transactional governance. Worse, since Russia, all too conveniently, is being blamed for the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh and the resulting ethnic cleansing, Pashinyan is reducing Russian influence in Armenia through incremental alignments with the Western camp. I would like to see the arguments for and against this, as would all citizens of Armenia.
Without a coherent strategy, what will Armenia do if a regional war erupts, there is an open border with Türkiye and a signed peace treaty with Azerbaijan? Treaties are mere paper.
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