In light of the Turkish-Israeli-US-UK and other nations’ partitioning of Syria, Russia maintains two main military outposts on the Syrian Mediterranean coast: a naval base in Tartus and the Khmeimim Airbase near the port city of Latakia. Russia ultimately will negotiate with Turkey over their fate, considering Turkish interests dominate the northwest and central north of Syria. In this game of Go, what might Russia negotiate, now or in the future? What opportunity has arisen in Turkey’s ranking of conquests now that it has virtually annexed much of northwest Syria? Russia’s influence in the Southern Caucasus could force the connection of rump Azerbaijan with its exclave, Nakhichevan, which borders Turkey. In this scenario, Russia might encourage either an Azerbaijani attack on southern Armenia or provoke a second instance of Azerbaijani-led ethnic cleansing of Armenians, this time from south Armenia.
The first was last year when, under the eyes of thousands of so-called Russian peacekeepers, Azerbaijani forces ethnically cleansed 130,000 Armenians from what remained of Nagorno-Karabakh after Azerbaijan successfully conquered the region. With Russia’s support, Turkey and Azerbaijan now demand an east-west route from Armenia, referred to as the Zangezur Corridor. This annexation would serve the strategic interests of Russia and the mythical pan-Turkic endeavor. With Russian participation in such a corridor, it can regain some of its mechanisms of influence in the South Caucasus. However, the US opposes Russian control over such a corridor. Such an imposed corridor violates Armenia’s sovereignty, but in the modern era, international law is nearly meaningless or is weaponized by those who can get away with it.
Such annexation would further isolate Iran with a titular Armenia left administered heavily by Turkey. Much of this hypothetical dynamic could change if the mechanics of a US-Israeli war with Iran spilled into Azerbaijan. One could imagine Turkey coming to the aid of Azerbaijan – through Armenia – if Baku attacked Iran or vice versa. This would further encourage Iranian Azerbaijanis to revolt and unite with the Azerbaijan Republic, at best, or at least ignite massive civil unrest across northern Iran. Southern Armenia may have been up for grabs as far back as the 2018 Armenian [so-called] Velvet Revolution, ushering in Nikol Pashinyan as prime minister. This also fits the hypothesis that the 2020 Karabakh War was a proxy war and an engineered defeat. Maps in Armenia have been published without any of its southern regions. In contrast, maps on Turkish TV show a Greater Turkey encompassing the Aegean, parts of Greece, Bulgaria, Georgia, Armenia, parts of Iraq, and northern Syria.
A precedent was established in the late 1930s when the world was on the brink of WWII. Turkey had always demanded the French-administered, mainly Arab-populated, Mediterranean coastal province of Alexandretta, where today, one finds the Turkish resort of Antalya. It was at the southern tip of this province where the Turks shot down the Russian SU-24 jet in 2015. Anti-Nazi powers juggled for political allies and jockeyed for influence anywhere they could. Through creative demographics, with Turkish soldiers and police stationed throughout Alexandretta, this province ‘voted’ for annexation with Turkey. The French relinquished the region of Alexandretta (a pseudo-republic by then) to Turkey in 1939 with assurances by Turkey that it would not enter WWII on the side of Nazi Germany. Subsequently, however, Turkey signed a friendship treaty (Türkisch-Deutscher Freundschaftsvertrag) with the Nazis in 1941. Turkey’s so-called ‘neutral position’ during WWII so angered the Allied powers that plans for an invasion of Turkey were close to being executed. The Turkish leopard has not changed its spots in nearly a century later on the brink of WWIII; Turks say one thing but do another, such as public support for Palestinians, yet supply half of Israeli crude oil needs by transporting Azerbaijani and stolen Syrian oil through Turkish pipelines. The French gave away something, not theirs, as Russia could facilitate an Azerbaijani takeover of land not belonging to either.
With Armenia under an existential threat from Turkey and Azerbaijan, Prime Minister Pashinyan claimed many times, and again on December 4, 2024, in Parliament, “Armenia considers itself outside the CSTO; its return is difficult, if not impossible.” Armenia has a challenge defending itself, and the only significant entities that have an interest in Armenia with at least minimal sovereignty within its internationally recognized borders are Iran, the Armenian people, and Russia under certain conditions. Not being a party to any official military alliance, Armenia makes continuous statements regarding EU partnership. Indeed, Armenia buys French and Indian arms, but no EU member state nor India, and not Iran, will send soldiers to defend Armenia. Russia decided Armenia had taken its course and adjusted accordingly, as it did when the Syrian army self-dissolved.
Considering the only promises one can believe are those a nation makes itself, what promises were given by those who created the conditions encouraging Armenia to freeze its military relationship with Russia’s CSTO? Western-funded NGO members will not arm themselves and fight to defend Armenia; USAID-funded institutions will not be seen fighting Turkey-backed Azerbaijan. What real defense options are available for Armenia since time waits for no one?
Such questions must be answered with cold Machiavellian realism.
Yerevan, Armenia
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