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Proportionality Bias and July’s Armenian-Azerbaijani Flareup

Written by David Davidian

By David Davidian

On July 12, a lowly  Azerbaijani military jeep headed towards a border military post operated by Armenian soldiers. It appears the Azerbaijani soldiers were not aware Armenians were manning this post. Armenian soldiers waved off the jeep. The Azerbaijani soldiers exited the vehicle, ran off and returned with reinforcements. Fighting escalated for two weeks, with villages shelled and UAVs filling the skies.

The result was a tremendous loss for Azerbaijan. A Major General, a Colonel, two Majors, scores of soldiers, a $30M Israeli-built Hermes 900 UAV shot down, and a Foreign Minister fired accused of pandering to Armenians. What such high-ranking officers were doing at a battlefront is unknown, contrary to generally accepted military doctrine. Armenians recaptured some highland real estate. Twice, an elite team of Azerbaijanis tried to retake the highlands, and both times unsuccessfully.

Tens of thousands of Azerbaijani civilians poured into the streets of Baku, the Azerbaijani capital, yelling “Allahu Akbar,” “Death to Armenians,” and “Take us to war.” Many protesters were beaten and arrested. Azerbaijani President Aliyev seized this opportunity to detain many of his opposition, particularly members of the Azerbaijani Popular Front. Human Rights Watch and EU Parliamentarians protested these detentions and subsequent torture. Azerbaijani authorities preempted an attempt by the Talysh, an Azerbaijan ethnic minority, to hold a large-scale autonomy-oriented demonstration. Aliyev charged exiled Azerbaijani artists and writers of being Armenian agents.

Since Azerbaijani soldiers violated its borders, Armenia notified the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Moscow-sponsored military alliance. It soon became clear Armenia was able to address this border violation on its own. Invoking the CSTO would have escalated the issue significantly. Azerbaijan’s strategic partner, Turkey, reiterated its support for Azerbaijan during an address by Turkish President Erdogan on July 14. Erdogan threatened Armenia with a second genocide, this time in the Caucasus. Weeks after this July 12 border indecent, Turkey organized extensive war games in Azerbaijan.

Proportionality bias is the tenancy to assume that big events need to have big causes. Such cognitive bias plays a central role in the creation and acceptance of conspiracy theories. The long list of conspiracies for the existence of the COVID-19 virus is an example of proportionality bias. It is entirely possible, and reasonable proof exists that the virus went from animals to humans. Conspiracies range from George Soros and Bill Gates as culprits to 5G cell towers. Just as simple explanations for the existence of COVID-19 are ignored, the simple event on July 12 is ignored and overshadowed by “big causes.” Conspiracies associated with the July Armenian-Azerbaijan flareup include:

-The fighting is a prelude to a Turkish-Russian proxy war (given Turkish-Russian friction in Syria, Libya, the Gulf, etc.)

– Armenians threaten Azerbaijan’s hydrocarbon pipeline infrastructure (within 10-20 km or so from this July 12 incident), disrupting the world energy flow.

-Armenians are aggressors (given stalled Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations).

-Azerbaijanis are aggressors (Azerbaijan is approaching budget deficit status as the price of a barrel of Azerbaijani crude is less than its production cost) and claim the negotiation process over Nagorno-Karabakh is worthless.

-The July events occurred at an Armenia-Azerbaijan border, not between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh.

While all of these items are worth discussing, none take into account the simplest explanation for events; the result of a lowly Azerbaijani military vehicle approaching an Armenian military post. Of course, this combined with high-value Azerbaijani personnel losses allows one to conclude the top hypothesis for the July events was Azerbaijani military incompetence. The acceptance of such a simple hypothesis forces analysts to take a non-Azerbaijani position. Nevertheless, war is chaotic, and the evidence speaks for itself.

During an August 20 interview Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, stated, (in translation):

The decision of the Armenian side to revive the old border checkpoint located 15 km from the Azerbaijani export pipelines caused heightened concern among some, an unjustified response from others and, as a result, launched a flywheel of confrontation with the most unpredictable consequences.

While Lavrov’s comments include diplomatic finesse, it corresponds well with our top hypothesis – the Azerbaijanis did not know that Armenians operated an abandoned military border post. Further, local anecdotal stories claim that Azerbaijani soldiers forgot to come back to this “abandoned” military post, and Armenians took it over.

The reaction of Azerbaijani President Aliyev was out of proportion to the magnitude of the preceding events. On July 13, Azerbaijani authorities accused former Defense Minister Rahim Gaziyev, of deliberately spreading “untrue information about the nature of the events on social network platforms,” acting “to weaken the defense capabilities of the Republic of Azerbaijan,” and inciting “riots and violent seizure of state power.” Azerbaijan’s leadership was wholly unprepared for events that began on July 12. Out of frustration, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense threatened to blow up Armenia’s nuclear power plant.

While it may not be alluring for political analysts to consider that circumstances during heightened tension can escalate due to simple chaotic events, creating unwarranted conspiracies adds nothing to dissipate the fog of war.

Author: David Davidian  (Lecturer at the American University of Armenia. He has spent over a decade in technical intelligence analysis at major high technology firms.Yerevan, Armenia). 

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David Davidian